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Empiricalstuaies have indicated that the elderly seem to
accumulate wealth after retirement, and that the desire to leave
Dequests is an important aeterminent of saving behavior, both Kinds of
results have cast doubt on the validity of the life cyclehypothesis of
consumption.In the firstpartof this paper, a model of bequests is
specified, and the implications for consumption and wealth trajectories
are derived. The main result is that, even with a bequest motive,
consumption generally decreases with age after retirement, and that
wealth will also decrease for all but wealthy households. In the
-
empiricalpart of the paper, wealth changes of retired households are
reported over 10 years of panel data. Contrary to many results from
cross—section data, the elderly do dissave: over 10 years the wealth ot
the elderly in tne sample decreases by about 27 real. A test fora
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itriough the life cycle hypothesis of consumptionhas played a
centra.l role in theoretical ana empiricalwork aDout consumption since
it was proposea by ModigHani andBrumberg (1954), many economists have
come to douot its empirical valiaity. Three Xmasof studies have
contriDutea to the doubt: simulation anaestimation of earnings and
consumption paths, Euler equation estimation, and microdata estimation
of the age—wealth relationship. In thispaper I am mainly interested in
the savings behavior of the elderly andhow it relates to the age—wealth
relationship, but 1 shall briefly mention all three kindsof Studies.1
Studies that simulate the consumption andearnings paths of
households (White (1978,1984), Darby (1979)),or estimate the paths
directly (Kotlikoff and Summers (1981)) typically show thatthe
aggregate of the present value of savings cannot account fora
suDstantial amount of the capital stock that is heldby households.
8ecause the holdings of capital stock notgenerated by household saving
must have been inherited, bequests must account fora large portion of
the capital stock. The authors conclude that thestrict life cycle
hypothesis (no bequest motive) cannot be true for animportant fraction
of the population.
I find it difficult to draw the same conclusions.First, as far as
the simulations are concerned, we have littleknowledge of the true
utility function parameters so that evaluation of the simulationsis
highly subjective, Second. the representative consumerapproach is
surely wrong given that wealth is highly concentrated in thepopulation.
ihira, mortality uncertainty is not usually considered,if there were
no uncertainty about the date of death, the strict lifecycle hypothesis
says that wealth would be exhausted at the date of death.However, when
the cate of death is uncertain people will oftendie With positive
wealth as long as the consumption function issufficiently concave and
as long as annuities of a certain kina are not available.Therefore,
1with uncertainty, the existence of bequests, large or small, does not
necessarily invalidate tne life cycle hypothesis. More to the point is
whether people would want to leave bequests even if the date of death
were known. Stated differently: do bequests enter the utility
function? Because we nave little quantitative knowledge of the process
generating savings, it seems to me that one can learn more about the
beauest motive from directly examining data on wealth holdings than
either from simulating data or from reconstructing the entire earnings
and consumption paths.
Many studies have used the Euler equation approach (Hall (1978,
1985), Flavin (1981) and Haysahi (1982,1985)). The objective of these
studies is to estimate using time series methods the parameters of a
stochastic difference equation for consumption. In this framework the
life cycle hypothesis makes the strong prediction that the influence of
wealth and income on consumption will be zero. Often these studies
reject the life cycle hypothesis at least as a hypothesis governing tne
behavior of all consumers (Hall and Mishkin (1982)).
Studies based on microeconomic data often investigate how wealth
varies with age. The relationship between wealth and age that is
generally found in cross section is implausi ie according to the life
cycle hypothesis; in particular the elderly seem to accumulate wealth
as tney age even though the life cycle hypothesis implies they should
decumulate (Mirer (1979), Menchik and David (1983), Danziger et al
(1982), and P(urz (1984)). 1 quote from Danziger et al: "the elderly
not only do not dissave to finance their consumption during retirement,
they spend less on consumption goods and services (save significantly
more) than the nonelderly at all levels of income. Moreover, the oldest
of the elderly save the most at given levels of income. The empirical
finding that the elderly seem not to dissave has probably had the
greatest effect in convincing economists that the strict life cycle
hypothesis is not valid. The reasoning is that there is a maximum age
to which people can live, and, without a bequest motive, people will
want to consume all their wealth by that age. Yet, wealth seems to
2increase at any age. The Conclusion is thatthere must be a bequest
not i ye.
I believe there are fundamental difficultiesin drawing such an
inference from cross—section results.Wealthy people tend to live a
long time; therefore, the older people in thesample will have haa above
average earnings in their own cohorts,, and their wealthholdings will be
,cet. 2•higherthan the wealth holdings of younger people. In
addition, each cohort will have had different lifetime incomelevels,
and rates of return on investments. Someadjustment, especial ly for
lifetime income, must be made or elsecomparisons across age groups will
be meaningless. In that the adjustment foreach cohort cannot be
estimated in the cross—section data, it has to beimposed; for example
it is often assumea to follow long—term trendsSuch as growth rates of
wages. This means that lifetime income at eachage is adjusted by the
long—term treno with the greatest ages having thegreatest adjustment.
Whether one adjusts observed income to estimatelifetime income (King
and Dicks—Mireaux (1982)), or adjusts wealth itself(Mirer (1979)), the
age profile could slope up or down aepending on theadjustment that is
chosen. Thus, the adjustment itself, rather than thedata, inevitably
determines the relationship between wealth anaage. My final reason for
not having much confidence in the Cross—sectionstudies Is that it is
very difficult in cross—section data to be certain thatpeople have
retired. Because some of the young elderlyare still working, wealth
will initially increase with age even after normalretirement age.It
is Certainly not inconsistent with the lifecycle hypothesis that the
wealth of workers increases with theage.
Papers by Diamond and Hausman (1984) ano Bernheim (1984)use panel
data. In contrast to many of the cross—sectionstudies, both find that
the elderly dissave after retirement. The Diamondand Hausrnan paper is
based on the National Longitudinal Survey of oldermen. This data set
is not well—suited for a stuay of the wealth ofthe elderly after they
retire because even by the end of the 10—yearpanel the ages of the
sample range from 55 to 69. Even with a retirementage of 62, which is
3earlier thanaverage,only halt ot the sample woula be retirea in tne
last year; theretore, wealth changes ot retired people can onlybe
opserved tor a few years, and, even then, most of the retiredwill be
early retirees who may not be typical in their savingsbehavior. The
authors give no information about th numDer of observationsthat are
retired, but it is probably small. Furthermore, the wealth changes
reported in the paper are not directly and simply calculated; tneyare
inferred from a complicated estimation methoa which seems to focus on
tne retirement and savings of workers, not of retired people.Finally.
it is aifticult to judge the results because no definition ofwealth is
given in the paper. As the theoretical results givenin Section 2 of
this paper show, tne construction of the wealth variable reauires care;
some seemingly reasonable wealth variables such as the expecteapresent
value of Social Security benefits will not give good indicationsof
consumer penavior.
bernheim'S work is a substantial advance over previous work. He
studies wealth changes ot retired individuals and couples from panel
data, and suggests an appropriate way to account for annuitiesand
Social Security in consumption ano wealthcalculations.2 In his sample
wealth generally declines between 1969 and 1975 and between 1975and
1979. This is the first solid evic3ence that the elderly do dissave.
The evidence is not conclusive, however, because he only observedtwo
wealth changes, and because he used only a small fraction ot thesample.3
In this paper I offer evidence on the empirical validity of the
strict lite cycle hypothesis against the life cycle hypothesis with
bequests. In the first part of the paper, some theoreticalwork
indicates which variables should be studied. The main result isthat
measures of total wealth that include the present value otSocial
Security ana other annuities usually do not give informationabout
behavior.1 then introduce and analyze a model in which lifetime
utility depends on the consumption path and on bequests.As I model tne
beQuest motive, the consumption trajectory will decline with age;the
wealth trajectory will also aecline unless initial wealth is large. One
4woulo expect that even with a beauest motive the wealth of most people
would decrease with age. Theretore, a declining wealth trajectory is
not evidence in favor of either hypothesis.in the empirical section 1
present oata that show the retired elderly in my sample do dissave. I
concluoe from this that, in contradiction to many previous stucies, the
wealth—age relationship of the elderly is consistent with the strict
life cycle hypothesis. Then I test for a DeQuest motive. My test is
wnether the saving of the elderly wno have living children differs from
the saving of the elderly who co not have living children.I find no
evidence for a bequest motive.
The data are from the Retirement History Survey. From 19c59 to
1979, the RHS followed approximately 11,000 households whose heads were
born in 1906—1911.I Study the wealth changes of the retired people in
that survey.
52. consumption and Wealth irajectories
I first review a simole model of intertemporal uti lity
maximization.I then introauce a model which includes a oequest
motive ano annuities with the goal of finding some guidance for the
empirical results to be presented later. To simplify the problem 00th
theoretically and empirically. 1 study only retired people so that
utility is defined only over consumption and bequests. Without such a
restriction the empirical work becomes much more difficult because tne
workers attitude about future work is not known, so it is not easy to
say how his wealth ought to evolve. A gooc estimate of the wealth of
retired people can oe maae, however, ano in tne absence of unrecorded
transfers, this is rest—ot---lifetime wealth.
I use six assumptions:1. People maximize expected litetime
utility. 2. The budget constraint is known; its specification depends
on the model under consideration. 3. Irie probability of death is known
and exogenous, Out it will vary according to age, race and sex.4.
People are not allowed unsecured borrowings, which implies both that no
one can die in debt, and that the budget constraint must hold at each
moment.5. Annuities are exogenously given. This assumption can be
defended on the ground tnat most annuities are job—related pensions ana
Social Security, both of which are surely the result of job choices, not
savings choices. Furthermore, privately purchased annuities are, 'in
thisbody of data, almost nonexistent probably due to their very low
yields, and their uncertainty. A paper by Friedman and Warshawsky
(1985) shows that in some years yields on annuities are dominated by
yields on long—term bonds, and in other years, they are only slightly
lower.In that annuities are nominal and there is inflation
variability, they are risky just as bonds are risKy; but oonos are
liquid whereas annuities are not. in tact, the desire for liquidity may
mean that through Social Security and private pensions many people have
been forced to hold more in annuities than they would have chosen even
6it actuarially fair annuities were availaDle. .Therealinterest
rate is known ana constant.
2.1 No beQuests or annuities
I Degin with a very simplified model which, nonetheless, Contains
many ot the important issues. Suppose that an individual chooses a
consumption trajectory to maximize
SU(Ct)e_Ptatdt,
whereCt is consumption at time t, 1J(.) is an increasing, concave
utility function with unbounded marginal utility as c approaches zero,p
is the (constant) subjective discount rate, anda, the life rate, is
the probability that the individual will be alive at time t. The
utility model is the standard time—separable expectea utility
maximization model. The budget constraint is
ce Ct w tor all T. 0
ihebudget constraint must hold at each instant; otherwise there is
some chance the person would die a debtor. Without annuities, however,
the form of the consumption function guarantees that wealth willnever
become zero as long as the probability of begin alive is positive.
The first order conditions imply that
= (r—p)(T—t) tt
where u is marginal Utility at time t, ana similarly torUT. this
equation simply says that expected marginal utility at time t must, at
the optimum, equal expected marginal utility at time I discounted back
to time t.Taking I>t, we see that the ratio of marginal utilities
depenus on the conditional life rate, the probability of living at I
1given the person is alive at t.If I is only slightly larger than t, we
can use an approximation to show how the marginal utilities depend on
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If(p+m1/a)>r Ut < Ut..Becauseof the concavity of u(.), this implies
that c. > c. At age 65 the conditional mortality rate of white males
is about .04, so that consumption will decline unless r is considerably
greater than p. Of course, even if r > p, consumption must eventually
decline because the conditional mortality rates increase With age,
eventually becoming unbounded at the last instant it is possible to be
alive. Most people would probably assume that p > r, however, so that
consumption will, a fortiori, decline when mortality is taKen into
account.4 When p + mt/at > r, wealth must decline with age:if wealth
were ever to increase, it would always increase due to declining
consumption, yet utility maximization requires that all wealth be
consumea should someone live to the maximum possiDle age. That is,
utility maximization requires that WN =0whenever aN =0.This is the
reason why the apparent increase in wealth that hirer (1979) found has
cast doubt on the life cycle hypothesis.
The conclusion that coi'sumption eventually declines is robust to
8some changes in the model specification. For example,p may vary. The
overall shape of the consumption trajectory wouldchange;yet
consumption would still decline at some age. Even marginalutility
could change slowly ana the conclusion would De thesame.
It may benotedthat if the form of U.) were known,equation(1)
could be solved for C1asa function ot Ct.A. anda1, ana the
parameters of the utility function. For example, the constant relative
risk aversion utility function U(ct) =c/r1—)implies that
(2) C= C (A Ia It It
With panel data on the consumption of individuals who facedifferent
life rates, one could estimate a,whichis the index of relative
risk aversion, and r—p.
2.2Bequests
I now consider a model in which there is a specificbequest motive;
that is, bequests are not simply a residual due to uncertain dateof
death but they give utility.
Suppose that an individual chooses a consumption path to maximize
U(ct)e_Ptatdt +V(bt)e_Ptmtdt
where V(.) gives the utility from a bequest, andbt is a bequest given
at time t.5 The idea behind the bequest part of theobjective function
is that someone will receive utility today from theKnowledge that
should he die at time t his heirs would receivebt. For simplicity, the
subjective time rate of discount of bequests has been made the sameas
the discount rate of consumption; the two discount ratescan easily be
maoe to be different without seriously complicating theanalysis.
The constraint on the maximization is thatbt =w>0. Again the
constraint will never be binding due to the form of theConsumption
9function. The solution to the maximization proolem is
(3) ua =u+ha+her—p) +Sv5e(5_tr_P)msds
where V5 is the marginal utility of bequests at time s. The
interpretation of this equation is as follows: someone contemplating
reallocating a dollar from consumption at time t to consumption at time
t+h will lose uat in utility on average at time t.if he lives to t+ri,
theoollar will have grown to ehr which will produce utility at the rate
of ut4.r. at+h ani adjust for uncertainty and subjective
discounting. With probability m5 the individual will die at s before
reaching t-*h;he will then have v5eI5tUP) in utility trom the
dollar. The integral sums up all of those possible utility gains. The
equation says that at the optimum the expected utilty loss must equal
the expected utility gain. Another interpretation comes from dividing
equation 3) by at ana putting h=1. Equation (3) is seen to be the
Euler equation for the utility maximization problem; that is, equation
(3) requires that consumption De chosen to make u. =Et(ut+i),which is
the Euler condition.
Holding constant Ct+h, Ut is larger than what it would be without a
bequest motive (V5 >0).This implies that, in the normal case in which
consumption declines, a bequest motive causes the consumption trajectory
to flatten, and, because the budget constraint cannot be violated,
consumption will initially be smaller. Therefore, more wealth is held
than without a bequest motive, and the wealth trajectory is flatter.
This is why the empirical observation that the wealth trajectory of the
elderly is flat or rising has been interpreted to be evidence for a
bequest motive.
The theoretical finding that a bequest motive causes more wealth to
be held is not surprising in that the oequest motive causes wealth to be
an argument ot the utility function, if, in fact, there were no bequest
motive but wealth holdings produced utility, the first—order condition
would be like that produced oy a bequest motive except that the marginal
10ut1ty of wealtn would oe weighted by tne life rates rather thanDthe
mortality rates. But in that the life rates are a function of the
morta'ity rates this is just a difference in functional form of the
utility function. In other words, there is a utility functiondetinea
over consumDtion and wealth that would lead to a first—ordercondition
n which wealth is weigntea by mortality rates.Thus, with wealth data
only, the hypothesis of a bequest motive could not beseparated from the
hypothesis that wealth enters the utility function. What isrequired is
the specificatjon that the marginal utility ofbequests will depena on
some observable variables. Without that specificationanc without data
on the variables, no estimation methods couldseparate the the two
hypotheses.
Equation (3) suggests an informal test of the bequest motive:
divide the sample into households with identifiable heirsand households
without identifiable heirs. One would expect that if therewere a
bequest motive the wealth and consumption trajectories of thoseWith
heirs would be flatter than the trajectories of thosewithout heirs.
Although this test is not as powerful as ones based on specificutility
functions, it has the attractive feature of being free of functional
form.
2.3 Bequests and Annuities
The models I have considered take wealth to be a stock fromwhich
future consumption has to be financed. However, there isanother
important class of resources for the elderly, annuities. By annuities I
mean those resources that offer an income flow, but which are not
bequeathable. The resources are not a stock in that typicallythey
cannot be borrowed against. Examples of annuities are SocialSecurity,
private ana government pensions, Medicare and Medicaid, anaprivately
purchased annuities.(In the data, privately purchased annuities are a
insignificant fraction of total wealth, probably for reasons 1 mentioneo
in the introduction).I divide resources into two classes:
11bequeathab]e wealtfl and annuities. When I refer to annuity wealth I
mean the actuarial present value of an annuity stream.
The utility maximization problem with annuities is to maximize in
the path [Ct)
SU(ct)ePtatdt+ SV(bt)ePtmtat
The constraints on the maximization are
(4) bt + 5(c5_A5)e(tds ￿ w0e.
and
(5) w =w0e+ 5:5_c5(t5)f'05
where A5 is annuity income at time s, and Wt is bequeathable. As long
as the marginal utility of bequests or consumption is positive, (4) will
be binding. (5) is the borrowing or bequeathable wealth constraint,
which states that bequeathable wealth cannot be negative.
The approach here may be contrasted with the usual kind of
intertemporal maximization problem in which only the present values of
income and consumption enter. The nonnegativity constraint (5) imposes
important restrictions on the problem.
The solution to the optimization problem depends on whether the
borrowing constraint is binding or not.If it is binding over an
interval, Ct 5 just equal to At over that interval: there is no
bequeathable wealth, and the individual simply consumes tfle annuity. It
over an interval (t,t+h), the borrowing constraint is not binding, then
(b) uta=ut+ha+he
P+ Shvse(tr_P)msds
as before. When there is no bequest motive, the bequeathable wealth
constraint is eventually binaing (it may happen at the greatest age
12possible), but with a bequest motive, the constraintmay never be
binding. If the marginal utility of bequests islarge enough, the
person wiMdesirealways to die with positive wealth. Let N be the
greatest possible age 50 thataN =0.When the wealth constraint is
never binding, from (6)
(7) Ut =Svse_Pi(s_tJ(ms,at)ds
The interpretation of this equation is thata dollar reduction in
consumption at t will eventually result in a dollar increasein
bequests; the integral accounts for theprobability that it Will occur
at time s, and for the discounted utility thatWill result. With the
specification of a declining marginal utility ofbequests, greater
wealth will cause the integral to becomesmaller; hence, consumption
will increase,
In this bequest model, the utility ofbequests comes from
contemplating the utility the heirs will receive from thebequest.
Because bequests are typically a small fractionof the lifetime wealth of
the heir, the bequest should affect onlyslightly the marginal utility
of wealth of the heir. Therefore, the size of thebequest will have
only a small effect on the marginal utility ofbequests. That is, a
reasonable specification for the utility of bequests isthat V(b) =ab.
An empirical specification shouldprobably allow a to vary from
individual to individual in that there is substantialvariation in the
wealth of heirs; but to find the consumptiontrajectory of a particular
individual, it seems reasonable to specify that V(b) =a,a constant.
I make that assumption for the rest of thispaper.
I assume that annuities are constant in real termsboth for
simplicity and because in general it is empirically correct,in the
RHS in 1975, at least 75Z of annuities wereconstant in real terms;
about 25X were constant in nominal terms, whichimplies that they had a
negative growth rate (Hurd and Shoveri (1985)). In fact, whether the
annuities are constant or have a growth rate does not affectthe
13analysis very much.
2.3.1 Positive terminal wealth
For a given level of annuities there are three kinds of solutions
to the maximization problem depending on the level of w0. i) If
'initial wealth is low, the borrowing constraint is binding At some time I
<N.BequeathaDle wealth reaches zero at 1.ii)If initial wealth is
high, the borrowing constraint is never binding and the individual has
positive wealth at N. Consumption is always greater than annuities.
iii) If initial wealth is medium, the borrowing constraint is never
binding but WN= 0.Consumption is always greater than annuities except
possibly at age N when it may decline to A.
I first analyze the case in which w0 is high (WN >0).
(8) ut=aetr_P5_tms,atds
In tnat UtISindependent of w0, the consumption trajectory is
independent of w0 for all w0 that lead to wN >0.This happens because
after taking into account mortality and discounting, the marginal
utility of consumption along the entire consumption path equals the
marginal utility of bequests.If consumption were to increase in
response to an increase in wealth, the marginal utility of consumption
would fall below the marginal utility of bequests, which would not be
optimal. Of course, one would have a similar result if the marginal
utility of bequests has only small variation.
Although the consumption trajectory is the same for all w0 that
lead to WN >0,the wealth trajectories vary greatly. Some examples are
shown in Figure 1. This illustrates that even if individuals have
identical tastes, their wealth trajectories will be quite different
provided they have different initial wealth.
The consumption trajectory when WN >0will depend on r—p and the
time pattern of mortality rates. When r =p,
14(9) Se_Ps_t)msos =at
so that Ut= afor all t, independent of the mortality rates.
Consumption is constant. This happens because effectively there is no
discounting: the individual is indifferent between leaving a bequest
'over all future dates. in that the conditional probability of aeath is
one, the expected marginal utility of bequests is a, Which is put equal
to the marginal utility of consumption.
When p >r,the integral in (9) is less than one. At each t,
consumption is higher than when p =r. As before, if consumption is
reduced by a dollar, bequests increase by a dollar with prooabilityone;
but the bequest occurs in the future ana must be discounted.
Whether the consumption trajectory is rising or falling depends on
the interaction between er—p and m5. From (8)aut/dt =u
=
(10) —am/a +(
where $= p-r.In general one cannot sign (10).
if we consider u to be a function of $,f($),then for small $
f($)=f(Q)+
where0<$<$, and means that the derivative is eqvaluated at $
=0.In that f(0) =U(marginal utility is constant when p =r),the




15it may be noted that the condition for dut/dt >0depends only on the
mortality function, not on a or on the details of U(c).
1 first Show that (11) is not trivial by giving an example in which
it is not satisfied. Without loss of generaltiy let t =0.Suppose m5
=5/Nfor 0 <s<N/lUand m5 =(5/9)Nfor P4/10 <S < N.Condition (11)
is satisfied if
'N
(12) m- m sds <1. Os
butWiththismortality rate function, the LI-IS of (12) is 25/18, and
dut/cit is negative.
I now give some examples in which condition (11) is satisfied;
these examples seem to cover the reasonable cases.
a) Constant mortality rate
With m5 a constant, ms/at =mt/at
=1/(N—t),which is a hyperbolic




Thuscondition (11) is satisfied.
b) An objection to a) is that constant mortality rates are not
found in the mortality tables for the elderly. Actual mortality rates
rise until about age 75 and then fall, and the hazard rate always rises.





=ô&eOt,ô and 6 positive.
If ô <1,drn/dt is positive at t =0,and eventually drnt/dt becomes
negative as required by the data. For large N (which is necessary so
16that aN0) it can be shown that Conaition (11) holds.
C)Foractual mortality data (11) holds by direct calculation.
We see, then, that both foractualmortality rates and for
reasonaole analytical mortality rate functions,dut/at is, to a linear
approximation in ,positive.This implies that along the consumption
path that is utility maximizing for all initial wealth such thatWN >
0,ac./dt is negative. This is the maximum consumption path, (c*J.
Along this path the marginal utility of consumption equals themarginal
utility of beQuests after proper accounting for mortality andr—p.For
a given level of annuities, there is a certain minimal level of initial
wealth that corresponds to this consumption trajectory. Call thisw.
Any Initial wealth larger than w will lead towN >0.The wealth
trajectory (w*) is shown in Figure 1. [w must fall because if it were
ever to rise, it would always rise due to falling consumption. But the
terminal Condition is that WN be zero. All levels of initial wealth
greater than w will produce the consumption path c. As the examples
show, even though they produce the same consumption path, the wealth
paths all lie above (w*), and they all differ. This is an interesting
feature of this moael. Many investigators find beterogenoussaving
behavior (Kurz (1985), Diamond and Hausman (1984)). Here individuals
with identical tastes can have very different wealthtrajectories.
Therefore, if we observe some individuals with rising trajectories and
some with falling trajectories, it is not necessary to conclude that
preferences are different.
2.3.2 Zerotermjnalwealth
When initial wealth is less than w, terminal wealth is zero. The
analysis is different from before because the borrowing constraint is
binding on consumption. The consumption path will be below tc1, There
are two possibilities: the medium wealth case in which bequeathable
wealth reaches zero at N and, because the consumer never wants to borrow
against future annuity income, the borrowing constraint is never
17binding; the low wealth case in which bequeathable wealth reaches zero
before N, and the borrowing constraint is binding.
2.3.2.1 Borrowing constraint binding
This is the low wealth case: it is likely to be found over most
observations. In 1975 in the lower 1O of the wealth distribution,
about 67. of total wealth was bequeathable wealth. Over tre entire
sample bequeathable wealth amounted to about 44 of total wealth (Hurd
and Shoven (1985)).The consumption path in the low wealth case is





where w0 is initial bequeathable wealth. The first equation comes from
the requirement that consumption be continuous in t, so that it must
equal A at 1.The second equation implicitly defines I to be the time
when bequeathable wealth is exhausted. The third equation comes from
the first—order conditions for utility maximization. In principle one
can solve these equations for I, ct and Wt as functions of the utility
function parameters, w0, A, the mortality rates, and data on heirs.
Typical consumption and wealth trajectories are shown In Figure 2.
These equations illustrate three important points: first, the
expected present value of annuities does not enter the equations. In




18which is the present value of annuities to trie oate at which the wealth
constraint becomes binding. But this quantity is a result of the
utility maximization, not a cause of it. Second, from the point of view
of estimation, both A and w0 are variables that help identify utility
function parameters. Third, within the utility maximizing framework
considered here, ignoring the borrowing constraint leads to a
spec if i cation error.
It should be noted that the comparison of consumption paths or
wealth paths across individuals cannot give goon information about
behavioral parameters unless annuities are taken into account. For
example, the wealth trajectory of someone with a bequest motive may
decline more rapidly than someone without a bequest motive if the
initial mix of annuities and w0 differs. Furthermore, one cannot
aggregate bequeathable wealth with annuity wealth to produce a variable
that is useful in investigating behavior.6 For example, with a normal
consumption trajectory, the sum of bequeathable wealth and annuity
wealth wifl decline with age; but the rate of decline will depend on
the parameters of the utility function, the mortality rates, and the mix
of annuity wealth and bequeathable wealth. An extreme case is when the
only wealth is annuity wealth. The rate of decline depends only on the
mortality and interest rates, not on any behavioral parameters.
Therefore, one cannot learn anything about behavior from studying the
path of annuity wealth. In general nothing can be said about the
parameters of the utility function from observing how the sum of
bequeathable and annuity wealth evolves. It should be clear, however,
that the trajectories of consumption and bequeathable wealth have
behavioral parameters embedded in them, but their recovery is not a
simple mattter: the estimation requires the solution of the system of
equations given in (13).
When there is a bequest motive, the consumption and wealth
trajectories are flatter than without a bequest motive. An interesting
question is whether it is possible for the consumption and wealth
19trajectories to rise over at least part of the retirement period. By





where =p—rand ht is the mortality hazard rate, mr/at. Again 1 take
the normal case to be > 0.1 desire to find the cases in which dutldt
always has the same sign. As Table 1 shows there are just three
possibilities: f(t) is always negative; it is always positive; it is
initially positive but then becomes negative. This Is to say that
dut/dt can change sign only once, and in that case it goes from positive
to negative, and then remains negative. A negative dut/dt implies a
positive acIdt. But a terminal condition is that c1 =A;therefore it
act/dt is positive1 Ctfort < Twill be less than A, and wealth will
grow. Wealth at I will then be positive which violates the other
terminal condition. We see then that the only possible sign of dut/dt
is positive, or dct/dt negative: consumption always declines. This
implies that wealth always declines because if it were ever to increase
it would always increase due to declining consumption; yet w10.
Consider now a value of w0, w3, which just causes Ct to become
equal to A and wt to become zero at N. Any value of w0 larger than
leaos to > A and any smaller value causes consumption to reach A
before N.Let {CJ and Lw) be the consumption and wealth trajectories
associated with w0. They are shown In Figure 3 along with (c and
which were discussed in the high wealth case. All the consumption
and wealth trajectories in the low wealth case must lie below (ci and
Lw);in the high wealth case there is only one consumption trajectory,
{c*1, regardless of initial wealth, and all the wealth trajectories must
lie above {w). In the case of medium wealth (c1 > A and wN =0),the
consumption trajectory must lie between (C) and (c*) because consumption
trajectories cannot cross. The wealth trajectory must lie between (WI
20and Cw*1 because wealth trajectories cannot cross.
Table I also applies to the medium wealth case, but the terminal
condition cT =Ano longer holds. That terminal condition was used to
rule out dut/dt negative, so at least in principle one might have a
rising consumption trajectory. But the consumption trajectory must be
bounaed by (ci and tc*1. Consider Cttobe a function of w0. The
function will be continuous so that for small departures ofw0 from
either w or w0 (ct) will decline. It would, therefore, be surprising
if tc1 did not decline for all w <w0<w.Again, in view of the
terminal condition on wealth, the wealth trajectory would also decline.
2.4 Summary
The main theoretical results to come from this section are:i)
The consumption and wealth trajectories are flatter, cet.pj., when
there is a bequest motive than when there is not.If one is able to
Classify observations into a group that will not have a bequest motive
and a group that may have a bequest motive, one ought to be able to test
informally for the bequest motive by finding whether the consumption and
wealth trajectories of the first group decline faster than the
trajectories of the second group. Ii) With normal mortality rates and
with p >r,consumption trajectories decline even with a bequest motive.
If they are observed to rise, one should be worried about the validity
of the underlying model; the bequest motive will not explain such a
rise. Wealth trajectories also decline unless initial wealth is so
large that terminal wealth will be positive. One would think that most
people would have declining wealth trajectories. Therefore, declining
average wealth trajectories should not be taken as evidence in favor of
either the strict life cycle hypothesis or the extended life cycle
hypothesis. iii) There is no theoretical justification for studying
the sum of annuity wealth and bequeathable wealth to determine
behavioral consumption parameters. The annuity stream enters the
problem, but in a complicated, nonlinear way.iv) Given a constant
21marginal utility of bequests, one would find that individual wealth
trajectories vary greatly, some rising and some falling, even though the
individuals had identical utility functions. All that is needed is
variation in initial wealth.
223.Empirical Results
In this section 1 present evidence from the RHS on two issues: Did
the elderly in the RHS dissave over the sample period? Is thereany
emirical evidence of a bequest motive? The results are guidedby two
general principles. Tne first is to minimize functional form
assumptions.I hope to present the data in such a way that no
functional forms beyond those assumea for the aerivation of (3) will De
required. This precludes parameter estimation. The secona general
principle is to study the wealth of the elderly as a group. Thus. I do
not investigate individual behavior.7 My results can best be comDared
with the results from cross—section analysis and from simulations.
3.1 Data
The data are from the Longituainal Retirement History Survey.
About 11,000 households whose heads were born between 1905 and 1911were
interviewed every two years from 1969 through 1979. Thesurvey includes
questions about all assets and liabilities with the exception of a
meaningful question on the asset value of life insurance.8 From the
questions one can construct a (almost) complete balance sheet of the
household. Because the asset catagories are so fine, there are missing
values. The results reportea here rely on a method to fill missing
values in such a way as to retain any individual component. Details
will be found the the Appendix.
The basic unit of ooservation is a household that is intact over
two adjacent surveys. Were I to study changes in intact households over
longer periods, the sample would be reduced due to mortality.
Furthermore, the estimation should allow the households to reoptimize
every two years in response to windfall gains and losses. In addition,
I select only households in which it appears the wage earners are
23retired: that is, a househola enters my active sample when the
responaent, in the case of a single person household, or both the
husDand and wife, in the case ot a couple, has no labor earnings at
present or in the future surveys. As 1 mentioned earlier, the theory is
not easily testable if workers are included in the sample.
The object of stucy is the change in beciueathable wealth over two
years. There are five two—year periods. Data definitions are given in
the Appendix;I mention here that the important components of
bequeathab)e wealth are housing wealth, stocks ano bonds, property,
businesses and savings accounts less debts.
To study wealth changes one would like to estimate the coefficient
in the equation w2 =Xw0in which w2 ana w0 are real wealth levels in
year 2 and year U respectively, and k Is the wealth retention rate. In
the RHS data there appear to be reporting errors in wealth, so I use an
estimator that is robust to random errors with zero expectation.I
estimate k by
(14) K =Ew2/w0.
The ratio estimatorK =k(w2/wo)is not consistent for K. nor is an
OLS estimator.
3.2 Results.
in Table 2 1 report real wealth changes over the ten year period of
the RHS. They were calculated in the following way: in 1969 all
households that remained intact until the next survey, in 1971, and
which had no present or future labor earnings became the active sample.
K1969 was calculated according to (14) separately for the singles and
couples in that sample. This process was repeated for each of the years
1971, 1973, 1975 and 1977. Thus the sample on which the two year
24changes are based changed every two years because of retirement and
death. The ten—year wealth retention rate is the product of the ks:
it gives the fraction of a dollar that would remain at the end of ten
years in real terms.The table shows the percentage change in real
wealth. There are four sets of results. The columns give wealth
changes according to whether housing is included in the calculation of
beQueathaDle wealth or not.The first three rows are over observations
which have positive bequeathable wealth in the initial period. The
second three rows are over all observations. A later table (Table 3)
gives information on the number of observations behind the calculations.
Before I discuss the results in Table 2, 1 outline the rationale
for the four sets of results.In principle, all types of bequeathable
assets will change as the consumption trajectory evolves: in practice,
it is difficult to change the consumption level of housing because of
the costs of transition from one consumption level to another. This is
particularly true for the elderly. If actual consumption adjusts only
slowly to desired consumption, the trajectory of housing wealth will be
flatter than the trajectory of desired housing wealth. In addition,
rates of return on housing appear to have been substantially higher than
the inflation rate for the RHS sample. Therefore, wealth trajectories
that include housing will be flatter than desired wealth trajectories.
Until a complete moael of desired housing services and transactions
costs is developed, probably the best that can be done is to exclude
housing wealth from the bequeathable wealth totals.9 Later results are
based on wealth calculations that do exclude housing;in this table,
however, I present both kinds of results. It turns out that no
substantive conclusion is changed by including housing in bequeathable
we a 1 t h.
The idea behind restricting the sample to include only observations
with positive wealth is that households with little wealth will not
follow desired wealth trajectories because they will have reached the
borrowing constraint before two years have passed. The initial rate of
change of wealth would be misrneasured. Furthermore, anyone with
25negative wealth is, in the context of the economic model, observed with
error. Simple errors in variables arguments predict that limiting the
sample to positive initial wealth causes the rates of change to decrease
which, indeed, is what is found in the first rows of the table.I
believe that at this stage of descriptive statistics it is better to
allow negative wealth than to predispose the wealth changes to be
negative; thus, in later results I use the complete sample.
Table 2 shows that in all cases the elderly dissave: the estimates
range from 13.9X of initial bequeathable wealth to 29.2X of initial
Dequeathable wealth over the period 1969 to 1979.In the case that I
believe is most representative of desired wealth changes (housing wealth
excluded, all observations) there is dissaving of 27.3(., which is at a
rate of 3.2Z per year. Both couples and singles dissave, singles more
than couples. This result is predicted by the basic model because the
mortality rates of singles are greater than of couples: the household
composed of a couple will survive longer (possibly not intact) than the
household composed only of a single person. Therefore, the consumption
trajectory of a couple will be flatter according to (1), and the wealth
trajectory will also be flatter. Although this result is predicted by
the theory there are other explanations in the context of the basic
model. The first is that there is a bequest motive:if there is a
bequest motive that depends on identifiable heirs, the wealth
trajectories of couples will on average be flatter in that a greater
fraction of couples have identifiable heirs than singles. The second
explanation is that couples have different levels of initial wealth and
annuities than singles; wealth and annuities influence the wealth
trajectories.
Imposing the restriction that initial wealth be positive changes
the results by very little. Most of the excluded observations had zero
initial and second year wealth.
The wealth changes that include housing wealth are much smaller
than those that exclude housing, probably for the reasons given above.
The wealth levels in Table 2 were deflated by the CPI to find real
26wealth changes.I note here that deflating by a cost of living inoex
that is tailored to the elderly changes the resultsby very little. For
examDle, the Boskin—Hurd index (Boskin and Hurd (1985)) which isdefined
for five age groups of the elderly gives slightly less inflationthan
the CPI over the ten year period (6.7 vs. 7.1%). Thisproduces a rate
of wealth change of —24.6% against —27.3% In the basecase (no housing
wealth, all observations).
Table 3 shows percentage changes in real wealth in each of thetwo—
year periods and the number of observations. Real wealth declined in
all years except 1977—79. The table emphasizes an important fact:all
the wealth changes in this paper are ex post wealthchanges. The theory
refers to desired or ex ante wealth changes. While one wouldexpect
the two to be equal on average, in any time periodthey Will differ due
to unanticipated windfall gains and losses. Apparently therewere
extraordinary losses in 1975—77 and extraordinary gains in 1977—79. In
fact the wealth changes in the two time periodsaverage to about —7.2%
per period, (geometrical average) which is a reasonable continuation of
the rates in the three periods from 1969 to 1975. Aninvestigation of
the components of the losses and gains in the portfolios ofthe RHS
households deserves attention, but it is beyond thescope of this paper.
The table reveals a trend toward increasing rates ofdissaving as
the population ages and faces higher conditionalmortality rates. The
theory says that consumption declines with rising mortality rates. For
constant initial wealth, therefore, wealth levels will also decline.
However, the results in Table 3 are not conclusive In that neither
initial wealth nor annuities is the same over timeperiods, so the trend
in wealth changes can only be suggestive.
One explanation for the results for singles versuscouples in Table
2 is a bequest motive. As I mentioned in Section 2,one cannot
distinguish a bequest motive from a wealth—augmented utility function
unless one is willing to specify that the utility ofbequests depends on
observable variables. Here I test for a bequest motiveby specifying
that it depends on whether the household has living children.° Of
27course, the aefinition could be expanded to include siblings, aunts,
uncles, parents, nieces and nephews, but, as we shall see, the results
are so unpromising that I have not gone further.
In Table 4 I give the wealth changes according to whether the
household has living children or not, and the average number of
observations in each two—year period. The theoretical work in Section 2
indicated that a bequest motive would flatten the consumption
trajectory; therefore the household would save more. The empirical
result in the table is that households with children actually save less
than households without children; therefore, there is no evidence for a
bequest motive. The empirical result does not depend on whether housing
wealth is included: both singles and couples with children still save
less than singles and couples without children.
Although the results in Table 4 give no evidence for a bequest
motive, they are certainly not conclusive even within the context of the
model in this paper.In particular, the theoretical results of Section
2 showed that both w0 and annuities determine the wealth trajectory;
the trajectory is not homogeneous in w0, and annuities enter in a
nonlinear way. If households with living children have different levels
of wealth and annuities than households without children, one would
expect that their trajectories would differ. In particular, decreasing
w0 while holding annuities constant causes w2/w0 to decrease.11 This
can easily been seen when w0 is small comparea to annuities: then,
aecreasing w0 so that w2 goes to zero will cause w2/w0 to go to zero;
thus, w2/w0 is not independent of w0 and annuities.
Couples with children have about the same levels of annuities as
couples without children, but their levels of initial wealth are quite
different. For example, in 1975 couples with children had initial
wealth excuding housing equity of about $32,000 whereas couples without
children had initial wealth of about $47,000. For singles the
corresponding figures are $10,000 and $19,000. If housing is included
the figures for the couples are raised almost exactly $20,000; the
figures for the singles are raised about $10,000. Over the five sample
28periods couples without children averaged 587.more initial wealth
excluding housing than couples with children; forsingles the figure is
727..These wealth data taken by themselvesimply that households with
cflildren should dissave more inpercentage terms than households without
children; they certainly leave open thepossibility that if the wealth
levels could be made the same, households withchildren would have
higher savings rates.
The experiment with the data I report now holdsapproximately
constant the initial wealth and annuity levels. The1969 sample of
couples with children was divided into 16 cells according to theInitial
wealth quartile ana annuity quartile.12w2/Ew0 was calculated in each
cell to give wealth retention rates byannuity and wealth quartile. A
similar calculation was made over the 1969sample of couples without
chiloren using the same quartile points. Because thenumber of
observations in some cells is small and the initialwealth levels are
close to zero, it is not meaningful toaverage the savings rates across
cells. Instead I compare the wealth retention ratesfor couples with
ana without children in the same quartile cell. Ineach year 16such
comparisons can be made across couples and 16 acrosssingles; over five
years a total of 160 comparisons can be made. Holding constant
annuities and wealth, I test for a bequest motiveDy asking whether
households with children had higher wealth retentionrates than
households without children. Table 5 shows the fractionof cells in
each year in which households with children hadhigher rates than
households without children. Under the hypothesis thatthere is no
bequest motive as reflected in the presence of children, theentries
should average 8/16. Under the hypothesis that there issuch a bequest
motive, the entries should be larger. We see that forcouples three of
five entries are less than 8/16 and two areexactly 8/16. Summing over
all years we find that in 33 of 80 cellscouples With children saved at
a greater rate than couples without children; putdifferently, in about
597. of the cells the presence of children causedgreater dissaving.
This is of course, the wrong outcome tosupport a bequest motive. Over
29singles, there is almost no difference by saving rates according to the
presence of children.
Tne results of Tableare consistent with the results of Table 4:
when there is no stratification by wealth and annuity levels as in Table
4, singles with children saved somewhat less than singles without
children; with stratification as in Table 5 the rates of saving are
about the same.In Table 4, couples with children save so much less
than couples without children that controlling for initial wealth and
annuities does not reverse that finding.
The theory in Section 2 suggested that the strength of the bequest
motive could vary from person to person, and I speculated that it might
vary with wealth levels. Perhaps bequests are a superior good. Table 6
gives information that will allow an informal test of that hypothesis.
In each cell I count the number of years in which the wealth retention
rate of households with children exceeded the wealth retention rate of
households without children. That count is recorded in the main body of
the table. The greatest entry possible is five; under the hypothesis
of no bequest motive, 2.5 is expected. The greatest entry in the final
column or row is 20; with no bequest motive, 10 is expected. High
values support a bequest motive.
Over couples there seems to be no pattern in the table either by
wealth levels or by annuity levels.I conclude that any differential
wealth retention rate by wealth or annuities is purely random. Over
singles it appears there is some differential by wealth level: singles
With children in the two lowest wealth quartiles had higher wealth
retention rates than singleswithout children in 26 out of 40
comparisons. Singles in those wealth quartiles are poor: for example
in 1975 the quartile points were $1200, $5759 and $18000 excluding
housing wealth. Singles with children would mostly be widows. Although
the annuity variable includes transfers from relatives, it may be that
there are more unrecorded transfers from children in the lowest
quartiles than in the highest quartiles. The effect is not strong
enough in the table to draw any firm conclusion without more
30investigation.
A problem with the Classification metnod in Table6 is that with
observation errors on wealth retention rates are bound to be higher
in the lower wealth quartiles than in thehigher wealth quartiles. Put
differently, the estimator given in (14) is not consistent forw2/w0 in
each cell when observations are assignedaccording to w0. Furthermore,
the means in the lowest quartile will be smallmaking the variance of
Ew2/w0 large.In Table 7, I report similar results but the
classsificatjon is by quartiles of initial capital incomerather than by
quartiles of initial capital wealth. Again, thequartiles for couples
are calculated across the capital income of allcouples whether or not
the household has living children, andsimilarly for singles. This way
of classification is like instrumental variableclassification: under
instrumental variables, the Classification would be fromfitted values
of the probability that Ahouseholdfell in a particular cell where the
predictor would be capital income. Whenw0 has observation error,
capital income is a good instrumental variable because itcomes directly
from the survey data; it is not derived from capital)3
The results for couples are very similar to thosegiven in Table 6.
As before, there is no pattern by initialcapital income or annuity
level. The number of cells in which households withchildren saved at a
higher rate than households without children is, however,smaller: only
34/80. Under the hypothesis of a bequest motivewe would expect more
than 1/2.
InTable 6 there was some indication that thereore unreported
transfers from children to single parents. Thepattern that suggested
the transfers is not evident in Table 714 Infact, it appears that any
differential saving according to whether the householdhas children is
random with respect to annuities and capital income. Thefraction of
cells in whicn saving was higher for households withchildren fell to
.42. The general impression, as in Table 4, is thatthere is no
evidence for a bequest motive even when wealth and annuitiesare held
constant.
314.Conclusion
Over the five two—year periods of the RHS the elderly in the sample
generally decurnulated real wealth. The estimated rate of decumulation
over 10 years is about 3.2 per year. At this rate, a household with a
20 year life expectancy will have reduced its bequeathable wealth to
about half of its initial level. The basic theory suggests that the
rate of decumulation is not constant: the slope of the consumption
trajectory depends on the conditional mortality rate, which increases
with age. This implies that th rate of wealth decurnulation will
increase with age, so that one could expect even smaller wealth levels
after 20 years.
These results are in contradiction to most cross—section results.
There are a number of reasons why these results are more reliable than
those from cross section;I study only the wealth changes of the
retired elderly; aifferential mortality by wealth level is not
important as it is in cross—section. Finally, no speculation about
lifetime earnings is necessary. With time separability of the utility
function, the household can remaximize each time period subject to its
wealth; that is, the wealth trajectory at t only depends on wealth at
t, not on past earnings or consumption. In the data, initial wealth can
be calculated from survey questions.
Bernheim (1984) gives wealth decumulation rates excluding housing.
His results imply 10—year decumulation rates of .41 for couples and .38
for singles. The comparable figures from Table 2 are .15 and .36.I
believe the results of this paper are more reliable because they are
based on a much larger sample; nonetheless, Bernheims results are
consistent with the conclusion that the elderly dissave.
There is no evidence for a bequest motive, at least insofar as it
depends on whether the household has living children. In fact, what
little evidence there is suggests the opposite. Furthermore, the
32houseriolds with children have less bequeathable wealththan households
without children. It the observed rates ofdecumulatjon continue beyond
the ages of the RHS households, the householdswith children will always
have less wealth than households without chfldren.In that about 8O of
the households in the RHS have children, thosehouseholds may bequeathe
more wealth in total than households withoutchildren; but the amount
per household will certainly be less.
Although intergenerational transfers are not the focus ofthis
paper, some of the findings can by applied to that issue. Kotlikoffand
Summers (1981) estimate that about 80Z of thecapital stock held by
households arises from intergenerational transfers. Theresults of this
paper cannot be used to check that estimate because the wealth
holdings
of the RHS sample cannot be aggregated to estimatewealth holdings of
the population. Nonetheless, these results do haveimplications for the
KotHkoff and Summers findings.
Even though no bequest motive was detectedby the methods of this
paper, there are two ways in which desired bequests could stillbe an
important part of capital transfers. Bequests could bea superior good
to such an extent that only thevery wealthy respond to the bequest
motive. In that the distribution of wealth ishighly skewed, a few
large desired bequests could account for most desiredbequests. Because
the RHS is a representative sample, suchhighly concentrated wealth is
not found in the PHS and probably would not be foundin any survey
because the extremely wealth may be reluctant to be interviewed.15it
should be noted, however, that even in theupper wealth quartile there
was no evidence for a bequest motive. One wouldimagine that even it
only a few wealthy in the RHS had a bequest motive, It wouldbe detected
in the upper wealth quartile: the estimator of thewealth retention
rate in each cell can be written as
k =Zw2/Ew3=(Z(w2Iw0)w0)/w0.
This is a weighted average of individual rates wherethe weights are
33initial wealth.
intervivos giving could be an important part of intergenerational
transfers. The RHS has questions on amounts given to relatives and
children outside the home. The amounts are very small, ranging from $39
to $60 on average depending on the year. While these transfers are
probably highly concentrated and may be important to a few individuals,
they are too small to aftect average rates of decumulation. The RHS
also has questions on the number of children 5upported either fully or
partially and on whether supoort is received from children.I estimated
the wealth retention rates over the sample which neither supports
children nor is supported by them. The 10—year rates of wealtn change
for that sample along with some excerpts from Table 4 for comparison are
Living children No Living Children
No Transfers A11*
Couples —13.5 —16.8 —1.7Z
(769) (957) (175)
Singles —41.1Z —38.OV. —32.6
(782) (1104) (477)
*From Table 4. The average number of observations is in parentheses.
There is no change in the basic result: eliminating households in which
there are transfers between the parents and the children increased the
measured saving rate for couples and decreased it for singles, but the
saving rates of households without children remain higher than the
saving rates of households with children. The change in the number of
observations indicates that there are substantial numbers of families
that have some transfers; but apparently the magnitude of the transfers
is small.
it may be that intervivos giving increases at later ages, but that
34seems unlikely: households with children already have lesswealth than
households without Children. This wealth differentialsuggests that
intervivos transfers take place before retirement,most liKely to
support consumption and education of the children whenthey are young.16
As such these transfers do not enter the stock ofcapital held by
households.
The most straightforewara interpretation of theresults of this
paper is that there is no bequest motive in the RHS, and,by extension,
in the elderly population with the possibleexceOtion of the very
wealthy. Bequests seem to be simply the result ofmortality risk
combined with a very weak market for private annuities.If this is the
case, there is no reason to replace the strict life cyclehypothesis Dy
models that emphasize the determinents of intergenerationaltransfers,
as called for by Kotlikoff and Summers, Ofcourse, one should use a
model that illuminates the question understudy. If one is interested
in understanding how most elderly wouldrespond to, say, a change in
Social Security benefits, the strict lifecycle hypothesis is surely the
place to start.If one wants to understand how the capital stock is
accumulated, one would probably want to study thevery wealthy.
However, the standard Consumption models may not apply: time
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Determination of the Sign of {Ut/t)
(I4ISES Ut-a UT-a
1 + not possiblenot possiblenot possible
2 + + + + +
3
4 + 4/—. 4/... *1-
N.B.T >t
In case 4, MJT/b'T can onlybecomenegntive while Ut <a.Whenthis occurs, the
trajectory switches to case 3.
38TABLE 2
RealWealth Chdnges from1969-1979:
Houriy Wei11h ind I iquidilywns(rdin( comparison.
HousnWc8lth -
fflalWeallh PQpjlaon pUflcluded
Observations Singles -25.2% -39.8%
with Positive Couples -2.9% - 16.9%
Only All -15.0% -29.7%
MI Singles -224% -36.4%





Veer jgl Couoles fl
1969-71 -3.9% -3.0% -3.6%
(1009) (419) (1428)
1971-73 -6.1% -2.5% -4.2%
(1290) (740) (2030)
1973-75 -12.6% -0.5% -7.3%
(1552) (1204) (2756)
1975-77 -19.7% -25.4% -22.3%
(1864) (1511) (3375)
1977-79 1.0% 22.9% 10.9%
(2187) (1790) (3977)






Singles -38.0% -32.6% -36.4%
(1104) (477) (1581)
Couples -16.8% -1.7% -145%
(957) (175) (1132)
All -282% -24.2% -27.3%
(2061) (652) (2713)
N.B. HousingWealthis excluded. No liquidity constraint imposed.Numberin parenthesesis
theaverage number of observations in h two-year period.
TABLES
Comparison of Saving Rates
1969-71 1971-73 1973-7b 1975-77j972zfl j
Couples 8/16 4/16 7/16 6/16 8/16 33/80
Singles 6/16 12/16 6/16 8/16 10/16 42/80
N.B.Entries are the fraction of annuity-wealth cells in which households withchildren
had higher saving rates than hOusehOlds without children.
40TABLE 6
Comparisonof saving rates by
initial wealth and annuityquartiles.
A.Couples
Annuity Quartiles AU Annuity
Wealth •1 2 3 4 Levels
Quartiles
1 2/5 2/5 4/5 2/5 10/20
2 1/5 1/5 3/5 2/5 7/20
3 1/5 4/5 2/5 1/5 8/20
4 2/5 2/5 2/5 2/5 8/20
flWealth
Levels 6/209/20 11/207/20 33/80
B. Singles
Annuity Quartiles AUAnnuity
Wealth .1 2 3 4 Levels
Quartiles
1 3/5 3/5 2/5 3/5 11/20
2 5/5 3/5 4/5 3/5 15/20
32/5 2/5 0/5 3/5 7/20
43/5 2/5 1/5 3/5 9/20
AUWealth
Levels 13/2010/207/20 12/20 42/öO
N.B. Entries are the frtlon of years In which saving rates of households with children
exedi the saving ratesofhouseholds without children.
41TABLE 7
Corn panson of saving rates by initial
capital incomeand annuity quartiles.
A. Couples
AnnuityQuartiles flAnn1tv
Income •1 2 3 4
Quartil
1 2/5 2/5 3/5 2/5 9/20
22/5 2/5 3/5 2/5 9/20
3 1/5 2/5 3/5 1/5 7/20
42/5 2/5 1/5 4/5 9/20
Afl Income
jjyei 7/208/20 10/209/20 34/80
8. Singles
AnnuityQuartiles AllAnnuity
Income .1 2 3 4 Levels
Quartfles
13/5 0/3 2/5 2/5 7/18
22/5 2/5 2/4 2/4 8/18
32/5 2/5 3/5 3/5 10/20
43/5 2/5 2/5 0/5 7/20
AllIncome
1.evels 10/206/18 9/19 7/19 32/76
N.B. Entries arethefraction of years in which saving rates of households with children
exceeded the saving ratesof householdswithout children.
42footnotes
1.See the survey by King (1985)
2.Inhis paper, Bernneim says that a gooc apDroximation to the true
value of an annuity stream is its sirTwle discounted sum, not weighted Dy
the life rates. Although I believe this is not always accurate, his
presentation of the problem has influenced the approach I give in
Section 2.
3.Bernheim calculated the 1969—1975 wealth changes over just 574
households, and the 1975—1979 changes over 1047 households. From the
same data set I use an average of 2071 households over the first period
and an average of 3673 households over the second period.
4.Although there seem to be no reliable estimates based on
microeconomic data in the literature, two kinds of evidence support the
claim that p >r.Surveys and psychological experiments in which peoDle
are asked to choose between a present and a future reward typically show
very high rates of time preference (Fuchs (1982)). Many people pay high
rates of interest on borrowing even though their incomes seem to be
roughly constant over time. On the other side, however, growth models
in optimal steady state imply that p <r,and that assumption is often
used in simulations (Davies (1981)).
5.This formulation is the same as Yaari's (1965).
6. Bernheim (1984) takes the sum of w0 and Airtobe a good
approximation to total wealth. How good an approximation dpends on how
large i is. Many households in the RHS have very low ratios of w0/A;
it would be surprising if those households would have large values of 1.
7. King and Dicks—Mireaux (1982), Kurz (1984), and Diamond and Hausman
(1984) emphasize the heterogeneity of wealth holdings and behavior of
the elderly. There is certainly substantial variation in wealth
holdings in this data set. See Hurd and Shoven (1985).
8. Hurd and Shoven (1985) describe the categories in detail.
9. King and Dicks—Mireaux (1982) advocate a similar approach.
4310. Because of the age of the heads of the households,most of the
children probably are between 30 and 45 years old.Thus, very few
households have children at home. Excluding households inwhich children
are present does not change the basic results.
11. Bernheim makes this point in a model in which themortality rate is
constant. In this model in which mortality ratesvary, simulations of
'trajectories from the constant relative risk aversionconsumption
function verify the result.
12. The classification method I use here isexactly the same as an
instrumental variable method if there is positive correlationbetween
capital income and wealth, and the instrumental variable method
classifies according to the quartiles of fittedw0.
13. The annuity classification is only approximate.According to the
basic theory the entire annuity trajectory influences thewealth path.
I used annuity wealth to reduce the trajectory to asingle number, which
was used for the classification. This is preferable toclassifying by
annuity income in that some early retirees must wait severalyears to
begin to receive Social Security and private pensions.
14. There were no single households in four cells;thus, there are
only 76 comparisons.
15. A further problem in the RHS is that the maximumentry in any asset
catagory is $999,999.
16. The lower wealth cannot be explained by lowerearnings: tyDically
men with children have higher incomes than men without children.
44Append ix
1.Begueathable wealth. The RHS includes very detailed questions
on assets and liapilities. They were aggregated to form the following
assets: net business wealth, net real property, net vehicle value, U.S.
Savings Bonos, Stocks and bonds, loans owned, checking and savings
accounts. Detts were: medical, store, bank and debts to private
individuals. Bequeathable wealth is the sum of these assets less the
sum of the liabilities.In Table 2, net housing equity was adaed.
2. Annuity wealth. The expected present value of Social Security.
Railroad Retirment, military, government and private pensions were added
to expected present value of transfers from relatives, Supplemental
Security Income, welfare, Medicare and Medicaid. and private annuities.
3. Capital Income. This is the sum of interest and dividends, a
service flow from housing equity, and rental income.
4.Imputation methods. Because there are more than 40 asset and
liability catagories, there are missing values. To eliminate
observations on the basis of any missing values would be to reduce
suDStantially the working sample; therefore, missing values were
imputed. The imputation methods is described in detail in Hurd and
Shoven (1985); Dut here I give a brief description. The goal of the
imputation method was to retain information about the asset holdings of
the individual. If a respondent indicated he had an asset but the amount
was missing, other suvey years were searched to find a valid value of
the asset. A median rate of growth was applied to the valid entry to
impute a value in the year in which it was missing.If no valid values
could be found, the median over observations with positive values by
marital status was imputed.If, in a particular year, a question about
a particular asset was not asked, an interpolation for that individual
from adjacent years was used. This did not happen for the important
asset catagories.
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